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DEATH OF THE SALESMAN: A NEW ERA
IN INTERSTATE TAXATION
The recent United States Supreme Court decisions' in the
field of state taxation of interstate commerce either make new
law or advertise an old rule which most tax practitioners were
reticent to accept as reality. The new rule or the old principle
revived is that states may tax net income of a foreign business
engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. The rule is de-
limited by the following criteria:
(1) The tax may not be discriminatory.
(2) It must be allocated or apportioned fairly to activities
carried on within the taxing state.
(3) Local activities must provide a sufficient "nexus" to
support the tax.
Business interests view the Court's ruling as a catalyst which
will bring about the garroting of many small and medium
sized entities which have very slight connection with the taxing
state'. Professional economists have decreed that if the Court
were to reach the decision which is now law, our economy
would receive a substantial shock3. With the spirit of a blithe
apocalypse, the decision has been dispensed for popular con-
sumption; the factor to be determined is will it be digestible
by corporations who upon reviewing past activities find that a
small sales force with equally meager facilities is going to cost
them far more than their attorneys had advised.
The states, says the Court, are now permitted to glean their
fair share of taxes to offset the burden of providing benefits
and protections for interstate business. This result is proper
if one is in favor of expanding state income opportunities re-
1 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. State of Minnesota; T. V.
Williams, as State Revenue Commissioner, v. Stockham Valves and Fittings
Inc., 79 Sup. Ct. 357 (1959).
2 Prentice-Hall in its "Corporation News" for March 23, 1959, uses the follow-
ing lead to describe the symptomatic results: 'Appalling Tax Burden Looms
for Corporations'.
3 Studenski, Harvard Business Review, November-December (1958).
gardless of the rigors imposed upon interstate business. A con-
trary stand demonstrates a philosophy of economic laissez-faire
aimed at preventing the Balkanization of commerce4. Regard-
less of the economic position one assumes there can be little
satisfaction with the Supreme Court's handling of the net in-
come tax cases. Semantics and antics have forced the average
and even the superior tax consultant to give advice which in
hindsight appears ill-founded. This situation is deplorable as
the Supreme Court has had past opportunities to espouse the
rationale of its present holdings; yet, the Court, adhering to
a policy of circumspection has deluded both lower courts and
tax practitioners into believing the rule to be something less
than what it has recently announced.
The Topsy-like growth of the law in this area can be illus.-
trated by viewing the factual entrapments of these new land-
mark cases against the background of past precedent. In the first
case 5 of the bi-partite decision, we find North-Western States
Portland Cement Company, an Iowa Corporation, conducting
its manufacturing business in Mason City, Iowa. With a sales
force of four, plus a full-time secretary working from a three
room office in Minneapolis, North-Western solicited orders
which were subject to approval, billing and delivery by the
Mason City plant. No realty was owned in Minnesota, no bank
account was maintained, and no merchandise was kept on hand.
Minnesota's net income tax was imposed upon:
Domestic and foreign corporations whose
business within this State within the taxable
year consists exclusively of foreign commerce,
interstate commerce or both6.
The Stockham circumstances were similar. In Birmingham,
Alabama, this Delaware corporation maintained its plant and
principal office. In Atlanta, Georgia, an office with a secretary
4 See, THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 7, 11, 22, 42; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat.
419, 445; Madison, Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, 10, 11
(1920).
5 Supra, at note 1.
6 Minn. Star. Anno. §290.19 (1945).
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was provided for the use of a salesman who devoted about one-
third of his time to the solicitations of orders from various
parts of the State. Orders taken at the office and on the road
were subject to approval by the home office. Orders were ship-
ped directly to the customer "f.o.b. warehouse" basis. Georgia
levied on net income received by all corporations, foreign or
domestic doing business within the State. Doing business is
defined as "any activity or transaction (within the State) for
the purpose of financial profit or gain." A tax was enacted
regardless of the activities' connection with interstate com-
merce7 .
In both cases, the taxes imposed were parts of general stat-
utory taxing plans and were arrived at by the application of
three factor ratios' .
Prefacing its opinion, the Supreme Court referred to the
importance of the question presented by noting that no less
than thirty-five states have net income taxe. Although both
cases had been separately argued, the Court handed down a
consolidated opinion because the factual situations were essen-
tially the same. In neither case was the apportionment chal-
lenged. Appellants contended that the state statutes involved
violated the commerce clause1" and the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Springing the result of its delib-
erations in the first paragraph of the opinion, the Court said:
We conclude that net income from the inter-
state operations of a foreign corporation may be
subjected to state taxation provided the levy is
not discriminatory and is properly apportioned
to local activities within the taxing State form-
ing a sufficient nexus to support the same".
7 Ga. Code Anno. §92-3113 (1937).
8 Minnesota used the ratio of Minnesota sales to total sales, Minnesota payrolls
to total payrolls, and Minnesota tangible property to total tangible property.
Georgia's formula included inventories, wages, and gross receipts.
9 79 Sup. Ct. at 359.
1oU. S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 2.
11 79 Sup. Ct. at 359.
With ensuing blandness the Court thus decrees that the
rule is merely what the law has been all along.
The majority opinion continues by stating that there is a
need for clearing up the tangled web of past cases' 2 . Readily
admitting that little in the way of standards has been established
by more than three hundred interstate commerce taxation cases
decided by the Court, the opinion begins a justification of the
rule set forth in the first paragraph of the case. The rule, in
result, does reduce the smog in the area of state and local
taxation of interstate commerce and provides a rather clear
principle and ancillary test, yet, the Court's opinion leaves
much "devoutly to be prayed for."
Clearly, the commerce power is vested in Congress 3. This
is a major premise which would be difficult to confuse, but
from this appropriate beginning, the Court meanders an un-
chartered peregrination. Citing Peck v. Lowe"4 as the first indi-
cation of the new rule, the Court moves to U. S. Glue v. Town
of Oak Creek 5 as its second authority. Here the Court en-
counters difficulty. This case involved the sustenance of a tax
on:
... that portion of income derived from busi-
ness transacted ... within the State . . ."
The Glue Company, a Wisconsin Corporation, made sales both
interstate and intrastate. The applicable tax statute reads as
follows:
Any person engaged in business within or
without the State shall.., be taxed only on that
portion of such income as is derived from busi-
ness transaction within ... the State,... [refer-
12 79 Sup. Ct. at 362.
:3 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
14 247 U. S. 165 (1918); this case concerned a federal tax on income from
exports.
15 247 U. S. 321 (1918).
16 Ibid., p. 329.
ence it had to a formula prescribed by another
statute] 17
The statute of reference was an apportionment statute. The
Court in its decision said:
This formula was applied in apportioning
the net business income for the year. Upon the
portion thus attributed to the State. .. the tax
in question is levied'".
In concluding the opinion, the Court said:
The tax was imposed in the same way that
other corporations doing business within the
State are taxed upon that proportion of their in-
come from business transacted within the
State'".
This case is questionable authority for the present decisions".
Intrastate commerce has always been taxable, this is the
"arri~re pens~e" of apportionment statutes"1 . When a business
engages in intrastate commerce within the domain of the tax-
ing authority, it should be made to pay its share of govern-
mental expense for the provision of benefits and protections22.
Apportionment becomes important as a device that approxi-
mates the ratio of the corporation's intrastate business to its
interstate business; thus, providing an equitable base for tax
imposition. The theory of apportionment is here receiving new
application.
17 Wis. Laws, ch. 658, §17706 (1911).
18 247 U. S. at 325.
19 Id. at 329.
27-. 0 79 Sup. Ct. 357, 375 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
21 For a short but soundly based discussion of the why and how of apportion-
ment, see, Lynn, Formula Apportionment of Corporate Income for State
Tax Purposes: Natura Non Facit Saltuam. 18 Ohio State L. J. 84 (1957).
22 These services are sometimes imaginary. See Greenough v. Tax Assessors of
City of Newport, 331 U. S. 486 (1947).
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In support of the premise of the Glue case, the Court cites
Underwood Typewriter Company v. Chamberlin23. In truth,
this case does follow the Glue case, but not the Court's inter-
pretation of that case. Rather, the Underwood case is concerned
with a tax "based upon the net profits earned within the State."
The situation was again concerned with apportioning income to
the taxing state where intrastate commerce had been carried
on. The Court's analysis in Underwood was that:
This tax is based upon the net profits earned
within the State. That a tax measured by the net
profit is valid, although these profits may have
been derived in part, are indeed mainly from
interstate commerce, is settled. [citations omit-
ted]. The profits of the corporation were largely
earned by a series of transactions beginning
with manufacturing in Connecticut and ending
in sales in other states. In this it was typical of
a large part of the manufacturing business con-
ducted in the State. The Legislature in attempt-
to put upon this business its fair share of the
burden of taxation, was faced with the impossi-
bility of allocating specifically the profits earned
by the processes conducted within its borders.
It, therefore, adopted a method of apportion-
ment which, for all that appears in this record,
reached, and was meant to reach, only the profits
earned within the State24.
Authorities in the fields of constitutional law2" and state
taxation of interstate commerce2" regard the Underwood
opinion as a pure case of apportionment between inter and
intrastate business.
23 254 U. S. 113 (1920).
24 Id. at 120-121.
25 See, Corwin, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1054
(1953).
2 6 See, Hartman, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 115
(1953).
The Court reaches its only really appropriate authority when
it cites West Publishing Co. v. McColgan"7. This opinion,
however, has the indistinction of being a per curium decision.
Per curium opinions as well as being anathema to practicing
attorneys are often regarded lightly, especially when subse-
quent decisions appear to be to the contrary. Reading the
California Court's opinion in the McColgan case, it is clear
that the decision is exactly in accord with the North-Wvestern
and Stockham decisions. Net income from purely interstate
commerce was held subject to a net income tax.
The California Court declared that net income is a proper
subject of taxation whereas the privilege of doing interstate
business as a subject measured by the net income would be
invalid. The contention in the McColgan case that there was
neither in personam nor in rem jurisdiction was rebutted by
the citation of International Shoe Co. v. Washington 8 . This
famous case involved the requisite due process connection
necessary to subject a foreign corporation engaged in interstate
commerce to an unemployment compensation tax. Interna-
tional had no office, conducted no intrastate business, had no
merchandise in Washington and owned no realty. The only
"nexus" was the residence of the Company's salesman in Wash-
ington. Due process was considered not to be violated by the
tax, jurisdiction being considered present for the purpose. The
Court, in the International Shoe case, tersely rejected the com-
merce clause contention posed by the Shoe Company by saying:
. . . Stat. 1391, 24 U.S.C. Sec. 1606 (A)
provides that "no person required under a state
law to make payments to an unemployment
fund shall be relieved from compliance there-
with on the ground that he is engaged in inter-
state or foreign commerce, or that the state law
does not distinguish between employees engaged
in interstate or foreign commerce and those en-
gaged in intrastate commerce." It is no longer
27 328 U. S. 823 (1946). The state court's opinion may be found at 27 Cal. 2d
705, 166 P. 2d 862 (1946).
28 326 U. S. 310 (1945).
debatable that Congress, in the exercise of the
commerce power, may authorize the states, in
specific ways, to regulate interstate commerce
or impose burdens upon it. [citations omit-
ted] 29
The use of this case to satisfy the "nexus" requisite for the
taxation of interstate commerce seems anathemic since the con-
tribution for unemployment compensation forced on Inter-
national Shoe Co. was based on Congressional policy. How-
ever, such a policy is undisclosed in the present cases. It would
seem that the concept of unemployment insurance is one de-
serving of more sympathy than the imposition of the net in-
come impost. The transpirance of rules of due process from
area to area in the law has created amorphis results incon-
sistent with the reality of the economic order. The transposal
of the rule of McGee v. International Life Insurance0 to the
area of state taxation of interstate commerce, a logical exten-
sion of the Court's latest pronouncements, would certainly be
disastrous. Carrying such a proposition to its logical conclusion
it would seem to follow that doing business by mail would
provide a sufficient taxing "nexus" to subjugate all interstate
commerce to the vagaries of the taxing statutes of each indi-
vidual state"1.
The McColgan case at the California level had upheld a
net income tax on interstate commerce. However, the case
viewed in the light of prior and subsequent decisions seemed
to be wrongly decided. The California Court cited the Berwind-
29 Id. at 315.
30 355 U. S. 220 (1957). This case held that an insurance contract effected
entirely by mail between a Texas insurance corporation and a resident of
California afforded the California Court jurisdiction to render an enforce-
able judgment on the policy in a suit brought in California, service having
been obtained only by registered mail to the corporation principal place of
business in Texas. The insurance company never had an office or agent in
California nor had any other business been done in that State other than
that connected with the policy which was the subject of the suit.
31 Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts from Pennoyer to Denchla: A Review, 25 U.
of Chi. L. Rev. 606 (1958).
230
White"2 case as its authority for the fact that "a tax may be
levied on net income wholly derived from interstate com-
merce." Unfortunately, there is dicta to this effect in the Ber-
wind-White case, however, the issue in Berwind-White is com-
pletely different from that posed in the McColgan case. All
that Berwind-White decided was that the delivery of coal in
New York City was a sufficient local activity to subject the
transaction to the City sales tax.
In the McColgan case, the California Court initially made
the point that the taxpayer's activities constituted "substantial
income producing activities." Consequently, the benefits and
protections afforded deserve an adequate consideration in the
way of a tax fee. The dissent in the recent Supreme Court de-
cisions views this factor coupled with the citation of cases
which they regard as questionable authority in the majority
opinion as indicative that the McColgan case was affirmed on
the basis of intrastate commerce being carried on within Cali-
fornia83
.
The vapid authority of the McColgan case seemed tenuous
in itself, but the advent of the Spector holding84 had decimated
any belief that the McColgan case was a valid precedent. The
Spector case involved a Connecticut tax on corporations "for
the privilege of carrying on or doing business within the State",
measured by net income allocable to the State. A Missouri
corporation maintained trucking depots and pick-up trucks in
the State. All business was interstate; the Court denied the
validity of the tax:
This court heretofore has struck down, under
the Commerce Clause, state taxes upon the priv-
ilege of carrying on a business that was exclu-
sively interstate in character. The Constitutional
infirmity of such a tax persists no matter how
fairly it is apportioned to a business done within
the state. Our conclusion is not in conflict with
32 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Co., 309 U. S. 33 (1939).
88 79 Sup. Ct. at 377.
34 Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U. S. 602 (1944).
the principle that, where a taxpayer is engaged
in both intrastate and interstate commerce, a
state may tax the privilege of carrying on intra-
state business and, within reasonable limits, may
compute the amount of charge by applying the
tax rate to the fair proportion of the taxpayer's
business done within the state" .
The Spector case was stronger factually for the imposition
of the tax than the McColgan case. The distinction, it would
seem, is the use of the word "privilege". But the Supreme Court
said in the Spector case that the problem ". . . is not a matter
of labels 6." In disagreement with the Court's legal sophistry,
notable authorities demonstrate that, in fact, the development
of taxation in this area has been a result of the application of
"magic words." Abracadabra will not do, but zibblybo suc-
ceeds. Professor Powell expressed it in this way: "States can
37tax interstate commerce if they go about it in the right way
The Supreme Court's present position as adduced from the
North-Western opinion is that a tax named Privilege is in-
valid, but one "on" net income is proper. The point is not
even academic-the economic results are exactly the same, al-
though the label is different.
It is noteworthy that although the present Court did not
consider the Spector case as creative of a "handle gently mood"
the states in general had regarded the Spector case as present-
ing an impasse to the taxation of net income from exclusively
interstate commerce 8 . Furthermore, at the time of the North-
Western case, only ten states had a tax applicable to income
35 Id. at 609-610.
36 Cf. Railway Express Inc. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 347 U. S. 359
(1949), 79 Sup. Ct. 411 (1959).
37 Powell, Contemporary Commerce Clause Controversies Over State Taxation,
76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 773, 774 (1928).
38 See, Roy Stone Transfer v. Messner, 377 Pa. 243, 103 At. 2d 700 (1954);
Redwine v. Refrigerated Transport Corp., 90 Ga. App. 784, 84 S. B. 2d
478 (1955).
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from exclusively interstate commerce 9. Professor Corwin4 °
had contended that the Spector case negated any possibilty
that net income could be taxed when derived strictly from
interstate commerce and this seemed to be the popular con-
sensus, although others have indicated that net income might
be so taxed41.
Another case cited by the majority in the North-Western
opinion which is difficult to reconcile is Memphis Gas Co. v.
Beeler4". This case was also cited in the per curium McColgan
case and admittedly contains wording which seems to support
a possible tax on exclusively interstate commerce. In the
Beeler case, Chief Justice Stone said:
In any case, even if taxpayer's business were
wholly interstate commerce, a non-discrimin-
atory tax by Tennessee upon the net income of
a foreign corporation having a commercial
domicile there . . . is not prohibited . . ."
Notice the term "commercial domicile" which provides an
entirely different basis of decision as indicated by the recent
cases. The first clause of Justice Stone's dictum is severely
qualified by the addended clause; moreover, Justice Burton in
rendering the opinion in the Spector case stated that the first
clause of Stone's statement was not necessary to the conclusion
arrived at by the Court44.
After examining the precedent cited by the majority Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's dissenting statement seems to be well
39 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Minnesota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania and Utah.
40 Corwin, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 209 (1953).
41 Stapchinskas, New Developments in State and Local Taxation, 10 J. TAX-
ATION, 232 (1959); Lawyer's Weekly Reports (Prentice-Hall, Inc.) 14,
No. 22 (March 2, 1959), No. 23 (March 9, 1959).
42 315 U. S. 649 (1942).
43 Id. at 656.
44 340 U. S. 602 at 609, note 6 (1944).
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founded. After recognizing the holding in the McColgan case
and alluding to its gossamer-like quality as precedent, he says:
I venture to say that every other decision-I
say decision, not talk or dicta--on which reli-
ance is placed, presents a situation where con-
joined with the interstate commerce was sev-
erable local state business on the basis of which
the state taxing power became constitutionally
operative " .
The present situation seems to be another example of ju-
dicial expedition into virgin territory couched in the comfort
of false precedent. It is an affirmation of Justice Douglas' prag-
matic view of constituitonal law that:
Stare Decisis has . . . little place in Amer-
ican constitutional law46.
Another way of stating the problem was expressed by
Judge Pound:
I think that lawyers and judges too often fail
to recognize that the decision consists in what
is done, not what is said by the court in doing it.
* . . the court states general principles but the
force of their observations lies in their applica-
tion of them and this application cannot be pre-
dicted with accuracy4".
The present rule is but the finality, a continually transilient
finality, of the philosophy of Realist jurisprudence. It is an
edifice to the cognizance of astute scholars who have recognized
that the individual judge, his preference, predelictions and bias
are the tumescence of the law 48.
45 79 Sup. Ct. at 380.
46 Douglas, WE THE JUDGES, 429 (1956).
47 The words are those of Judge C. W. Pound.
48 The extensive writings of Jerome Frank provide many examples of this
theory.
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It seems that the personal philosophy and the constituency
of the court are the determinate factors, precedent being but
a translucent night-shade. Philosophy, sociology, and psychology
are requisite for reconciling Supreme Court opinions.
Probably the answer to the present dilemma is the array
of the Court. Justice Clark who penned the Spector dissent
is the author of the majority opinion in the North-Western and
Stockham holdings. Further, Clarke is joined by Justices
Douglas, Black, and Warren who dissented with him in Miller
Brothers v. Maryland". This core of laissez-faire-minded sav-
ants have captured, metaphorcally, Justices Brennan and Har-
lan. This leaves only Whittaker, Stewart and Frankfurter to
champion interstate commerce.
From an economic standpoint" the theory posed by these
latest Supreme Court cases would seem to have the following
results: (1) Virtually all interstate commerce is taxable. (2)
Order-taking within the State on a regular basis is a sufficient
"nexus". (3) All that is required of the State is fair apportion-
ment. It would seem that the direct tax on net income will
cause such states as Connecticut 5' to discard their privilege taxes
on multi-state business in favor of the tax on net income. Other
states will no doubt legislate to take advantage of the new-
found source of much needed revenue. It is quite probable
that the present reciprocity laws will not be used as much as
they have been in the past and that the reciprocity system will
have to be revamped to some extent52 . It is also quite probable
that corporations will retreat from areas found to be unpro-
ductive and will be circumspect in developing new territories
through solicitation, unless the profit above the tax conse-
49 347 U. S. 340 (1953).
50 See, Cohen, State Tax Allocations and Formulas Which Affect Management
Operating Decisions, 1 J. of Taxation 2 (1954) and Silverstein, Problems
of Apportionment in Taxation of Multi-State Business, 4 Tax. L. Rev. 207
(1949).
51 Cf. the "privilege" distinction of the Spector case, sapra, note 34, and E. T.
and W. N. C. Transportation Co. v. North Carolina, 248 N. C. 560, 104
S. E. 2d 203 (1959) affirmed 79 S. Ct. 602 (1959). The removal of the
word "privilege" seems to be the key in validating a net income tax.
52 See, Prentice-Hall, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES, para. 1035 (1959).
quences incurred is substantiaP 3. The rule of solicitation plus is
no longer the norm 4 . As long as there is a regular process of
solicitation and the shipment of goods into the state, the tax
will be upheld. With the core of the Court disposed to a
liberal policy, the Miller Brothers dissent55 will be fused with
the due process rule of McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co.5" and it is probable that the law of substituted service will
be unrecognizable as we know it today.
The correlaties of this extension of the area of taxation
are the unprecedented burden of keeping literally tons of
records and the irrepressible increase in litigation. Justice
Frankfurter ably states the problem:
It will not, I believe, be gainsaid that there
are thousands of relatively small or moderate
sized corporations doing exclusively interstate
business spread over the several states. To sub-
ject these corporations to a separate income tax
in each of these states means that they will have
to keep books, make returns, store records, and
engage legal counsel, all to meet the diverse
and varigated tax laws of forty-nine states with
their different times for filing returns, different
tax structures, different modes of determining
"net income", and, often conflicting, formulas
of apportionment. This will involve large in-
creases in bookkeeping, accounting and legal
paraphenalia to meet these new demands. The
cost of such a far flung scheme for complying
with the taxing requirements of the different
states may well exceed the burden of the taxes
themselves, especially in the case of small com-
53 See, Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501 (1942); Bass, Ratcliff, and
Gretton v. State Tax Commissioner, 266 U. S. 271 (1924).
5 4Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 234 La. 651, 101
So.2d 70 (1959) affirmed 79 S. Ct. 602 (1959).
55 Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 357, dissenting opinion (1953).
56 Supra, note 30.
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panies doing a small volume of business in
several' states".
Of paramount importance will be the complications of ap-
plying the theories of allocation and apportionment "8. Alloca-
tion is geographical, that is, income is attributed wholly to a
particular state. Apportionment is the division of income by a
mathematical process which is based on the average ratio of
various factors, e.g., payrolls, sales and property. Both processes
in essence are modes of determining what is locally taxable.
Both involve the use of statutory formulas.
The allocation and apportionment formulae have been re-
plete with inequity and uncertainty. Unlike the science of ele-
mentary mathematics which it purports to use, formula appor-
tionment is not mathematically accurate and need not be5".
The crux of the problem is the many divergent factors which
the states use in reaching a ratio applicable to income tax.
Property - tangible and intangible -, business done, sales,
gross receipts, and payrolls and manufacturing costs are ex-
emplary of the ingredients of the particular formulas. They
appear in various combinations and permutations depending
on the efficacy of their utilization in taxing the predominant
income sources of the state"° . It is this fact of non-uniformity
which will lead to inequity when the various states apply their
formulas for tax purposes. A company has only 100% of
its income which it can allow the states to tax, otherwise, the
business would be unable to compete in the national emporium.
A tax of 200% of one's business income is a distinct possibility
57 79 S. Ct. at 381.
58 In regard to allocation see, Altman and Kessling, ALLOCATION OF IN-
COME IN STATE TAXATION (1950) and Ford, THE ALLOCATION
OF CORPORATE INCOME FOR THE PURPOSE OF STATE TAX-
ATION (1933). On separate accounting see, Hartfield, ACCOUNTING,
ITS PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS (1928). On apportionment see,
CONTROLLERSHIP FOUNDATION, APPORTIONMENT FORMULAE
AND FACTORS USED BY STATE IN LEVYING TAXES BASED ON
OR MEASURED BY NET INCOME ON MANUFACTURING, DIS-
TRIBUTIVE AND EXTRACTION CORPORATIONS (1954).
59 Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U. S. 501 (1942).
60 See, Silverstein, Problems of Apportionment in Taxation of Multi-State Busi-
ness, 4 Tax. L. Rev. 207 (1949).
when apportionment runs wild. Progress toward a uniformity
of apportionment has not been achieved although many econ-
omy foundation studies have attempted to allay its evils61.
Apportionment is perforce arbitrary; it need not, however, be
confiscatory.
The United States Supreme Court has often handled cases
involving questionable apportionment. In Maxwell v. Kent-
Coffey Mfg. Co.62, affirmed by the Supreme Court without opin-
ion, a tax was upheld on a Delaware corporation conducting
a manufacturing business in North Carolina. To determine net
income attributable to North Carolina, the ratio of the fair
cash value of real and personal property within the State to
all of its property everywhere was used. As 99.2 % of the real
and personal property was located in North Carolina the tax
was levied on this proportion of its net income. The inequity
of this situation is apparent in view of the fact that only .0002 %
of the company's total sales were made within the State. It is
clear that through an adroit use of real and personal measures
some states for example, could capture the bulk of the income
from the sale and manufacture of automobiles.
In Butler Brothers v. McColgan63 and Bass, Ratcliff and
Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commission 4, income was held
attributable, for purposes of taxation, to states in which losses
were heavy. Justification for the formula applied and the re-
sultant tax was grounded on the economic leverage of unitary
business. An attempt to show that a formula violates due
process or unduly burdens commerce is almost an insurmount-
able barrier and is made more difficult by the intricacies of
separate accounting15.
61 See, Schultz and Harriss, AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE (6th Ed. 1954).
62 204 N. C. 365, 168 S. E. 397, affirmed 291 U. S. 642 (1934).
63 315 U. S. 501 (1942).
64 266 U. S. 271 (1924).
65 See, Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlin, 254 U. S. 114 (1920);
Norfolk and W. Ry. v. North Carolina ex tel Maxwell, 297 U. S. 682
(1936).
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In 1944, the Supreme Court permitted Minnesota, as the
domiciliary state, to tax fully all planes of North-Western Air-
lines although the ships were present in other states much of
the taxable year6". This case aroused such a furor that Congress
was spurred to action. The Civil Aeronautics Board was di-
rected to study the problem. A 158 page report was submitted
to Congress, several bills were proposed, but no uniform
mode of apportionment was forthcoming.
Unfettered commerce has been the basis of our economic
prosperity. While big business may be strong enough to with-
stand all onslaughts, lesser economic units undoubtedly need
protection.
Some scholars have advocated that taxing in this field be
done solely by the Federal Government, with a subsequent dis-
position of proceeds to the states on a meritorious basis". Im-
possibility seems to deny the practical simplicity of this solution.
However, aid to education, highway construction, unemploy-
ment aleviation, and other programs incline to this method.
Other nations, such as India, have adopted in part such a pro-
gram to insure a functional Federal system.
Optimum employment and production are absolutely neces-
sary in our present era of international hypertension. Both
national and local economic entities must be enhanced. There
must be a balance struck to solve economic problems which
pervade our Federal system. The United States Supreme Court
has been a pragmatic institution, but its decisions are necessarily
fettered by the limited knowledge it possesses in certain areas.
The present problem can be solved neither by philosophical
syllogism without practical perspective nor by legislative in-
action based on disagreement stemming from geographic in-
terest. An honest evaluation and solution is compulsory to
insure our economic stability, an element which is primary in
maintaining our democratic status in the international panoply.
JoHN R. BATT
66 Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292 (1944).
67 Rodell, A Primer on Interstate Taxation, 44 Yale L. J. 1166 (1935).
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